in the production, collection, organization, and transfer of federally funded STI? These questions, while easily framed, cannot be answered in "yes" or "no" fashion. They do, however, form the basis for spirited public policy debate and scholarly investigation. This article will attempt to examine them by focusing on the issues and opportunities relative to STI and competitiveness in the United States.
BACKGROUND
Prior to World War II, the funding of science and technology by the federal government was limited and was concentrated in a handful of Federal agencies. The federal government funded between 12 and 20 percent of all U.S. R&D in the 1930s. All that changed with war in Europe. Today, the number is much closer to 50 percent.
The World War 11 era witnessed increased participation on the part of academia and industry in government-sponsored R&D. Their enhanced role set the stage for the revolution in federally funded R&D following the war.
Agriculture, aviation, defense, and health have enjoyed long histories of federal support and practical success. The success of these programs together with environmental concerns, the energy crisis, and various social issues prompted lawmakers and policy makers to consider the use of federal funds to stimulate innovation in other industries, but with little success. Why have these programs succeeded while other have failed? Two of these programs, agriculture and aviation, are discussed here.
Both are noteworthy for their practical success. Both serve as successful models for implementing targeted federally funded R&D and for understanding the diffusion of federally funded STI. Both models vary in their use of active information intermediaries and surrogates.
Agriculture.
The assumption that the country derives economic benefit from federally funded science and technology has been fundamental to government policy since after the American Civil War. Agricultural science was the first federally funded science and technology program. It became so with the passage of the Hatch Act in 1887. The act provided federal funding for research at the agricultural research stations associated with the land-grant colleges which were created in 1862 by the first Morrill Act.
For nearly a century, since the passage of the Hatch Act, the federal government has had a program to support applied research related to improved agricultural productivity.
Policy makers believed that a productive agricultural sector was essential to the country's well-being, and that farmers could not be expected to do their own research. Agricultural research remained the largest recipient of Federal support until after World War II.
There is general agreement among public policy makers that the agricultural model was successful in diffusing federally funded agricultural research to farmers (users), and thus in raising their level of agricultural productivity. Aviation. Federal funding for aviation was the federal government's second venture in targeted R_D. The first consistent federal funding for aviation began with the passage of The underutilization of technical knowledge rather than the utilization of technical knowledge constitutes the critical policy issue associated with federally funded science and technology programs. Other reasons notwithstanding, the common element associated with less than successful targeted federally funded science and technology appears to be the failure to include "knowledge diffusion" policy in the form of a program that links knowledge "production" with knowledge "utilization."
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES

CONCERNING COMPETITIVENESS
The thesis of this article is that federally funded STI has the potential to increase U.S.
industrial innovation and productivity, and to maximize the economic competitiveness and vitality of the country. Our experience as a nation suggests that those federally targeted science and technology programs considered to be successful recognized the interdependence of knowledge production and knowledge transfer. There is, however, concern.
Over the past 30 years, more than 50 studies relative to federal STI have been conducted.
These studies raise a number of specific issues and concerns. There are numerous issues and opportunities associated with Federal STI. Five of those considered to be most significant in terms of their impact on U.S. competitiveness have been selected for discussion here.
Issue 1: Knowledge Production and Knowledge Utilization
The U.S. government is the single largest source of STI in the world. The results of this research are considered by many to be an essential component of the Nation's economic competitiveness.
However, Federal policy makers have been concerned that the information created through the billions of dollars spent annually by the federal government is not well utilized because the transfer process between the producer and user is inadequate.
Dissemination efforts are not viewed as an important component of the R&D process, and therefore there is a low level of support for knowledge transfer in comparison to knowledge production. This producer-user disconnect practically guarantees that much of the Federal investment in creating STI will not bear fruit in terms of tangible products and innovations. This disconnect stands in stark contrast to the agriculture and aviation programs.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with the recognition by federal policy makers and lawmakers that federal STI is a critical aspect of the R&D process and serves a variety of other national goals. Policy makers involved in federal science and technology programs need to understand the relationship of STI to the R&D process:
knowledge transfer is an inseparable part of R&D, and knowledge transfer must be an integral part of federal science and technology programs.
Issue 2: federal STI Policy
The federal government has been involved in creating, supporting, and transferring STI One effort to remedy the STI policy void has been the formation of CENDI, a group of STI managers working to develop STI standards and to solve common problems. However, while the efforts of CENDI are admirable, they fall far short of the coordinated federal STI policy and policy implementation and oversight needed to help ensure that federal STI is actively used to enhance U.S. economic competitiveness.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. economic competitiveness exists with a more clear delineation of roles and responsibilities in federal STI policy implementation.
For years the federal government has played an active role in the transfer of federally funded STI.
During the Reagan admires"tration, this active role came under intense criticism and scrutiny, manifested itself in greater involvement on the part of the private sector in transferring the results of federally funded STI, and was exemplified by the desire of that administration to privatize many federal responsibilities and STI activities including the functions of the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).
Consequently, a significant element of federal STI policy should include the following:
• determination of the players and their respective roles;
• effective working relationships between the public and private sectors;
• a strong coordination function to ensure that the various players carry their respective roles and responsibilities with optimum efficiency and effectiveness;
• more interactive, user-guided involvement and the removal of "cultural" barriers between federal STI producers and users; and The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with a better understanding of the knowledge diffusion process as it relates to federal STI. Innovation is a complex process composed of multiple and interrelated systems. A better understanding of knowledge diffusion by federal policymakers, R&D managers, and federal information professionals should result in more intelligently designed public policy and programs than could, in turn, enhance U.S. competitiveness.
Issue 4: Scientific and Technical Information
A model flat depicts the transfer of scientific and technical information in federally funded aerospace I_D is composed of two parts: the informal, that relies on collegial contacts, and the formal, that relies on surrogates and information intermediaries to complete the producer-to-user knowledge transfer process (Figure 1) . the transfer process is increased if the information intermediaries are active: i.e., they take information from one place and move it to another, often face to face. The classic example of an active information intermediary is the agricultural extension agent. Passive information intermediaries, on the other hand, simply make the information available, relying on the initiative of the user to request or search out the information needed. Assessment. A number of studies in recent years have been specifically concerned with STI, knowledge transfer, and U.S. industrial competitiveness.
They find that knowledge transfer procedures have not been adopted by federally supported information transfer activities, and that dissemination activities are treated as afterthoughts.
Problems exist with the total system as well as with the two parts. The total federal system of information transfer is passive, fragmented, and unfocused, and has no coherent or systematically designed means of transferring the results of federally funded R&D to the user.
The problem with the informal part of the system is that from collegial contacts, engineers Two problems exist with the formal aspects of the system. First, the formal part of the system employs one-way source-to-user transmission, which is not responsive to the user context. Rather, these efforts appear to start with an information system into which they later try to retrofit the users' requirements. The consensus of the findings from the empirical research is that interactive, two-way communications are required for effective information transfer.
Second, the formal part of the system relies heavily on the use of information intermediaries. The problem in evaluating this is that empirical findings on the effectiveness of these individuals and the role they play in information transfer are sparse and inconclusive.
Their impact is likely to be strongly conditional and limited to a specific institutional context.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness begins with an understanding of the federal STI system and component subsystems. Empirical investigations, using innovative methodologies and rigorous experimental designs, need to be undertaken. The present system uses one-way source-to-user transmission procedures that do not appear to be responsive to the user context. These procedures should be replaced by interactive, two-way communication. "Cultural differences," the often-cited impediment to the development of a two-way exchange between information producers and users, should be reduced wherever possible. One school fosters and encourages the unrestricted, full exchange of such information. Proponents of this approach take the position that only unrestricted flow, complete freedom, and access to information can ensure vital cross-fertilization of research results among engineers and scientists, both nationally and internationally. These proponents also state that a free exchange is vital for the promotion of U.S. competitiveness and innovation. They emphasize that unrestricted, full exchange of information is a two-way street.
The other school of thought advocates the protection of information by restricting access.
Proponents of this approach believe that the flow of information must be restricted to control military technology vital to U.S. technological superiority, to protect national defense, and to prevent technology drafting (following in the tailwind of U.S. technology advances).
This philosopby also claims that protecting information by restricting access promotes U.S. competitiveness and innovation.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with the recognition that, in simple truth, no empirical evidence exists that warrants the total adoption of either school of thought.
What is needed is a middle ground, a balanced approach that will protect U.S. national security and foster U.S. competitiveness in the international marketplace.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with an answer to the question "Does the classification of government-funded R&D, for reasons of national security, actually restrain the competitiveness and innovativeness of American industry?" The Elliott Report of 1964 recommended that a mechanism be developed and implemented that will ensure that classified or otherwise restricted STI, usually in the form of U.S. government technical reports, does not remain unavailable to American industry any longer than is essential to the national interest, s To this should be added the need for a program that will work actively to ensure that declassified and otherwise limited-distribution U.S. government technical reports are made available to American industry.
CONCLUSION
The federal government spends approximately $60 billion annually but virtually none of this is for research on how to best transfer the results of federally funded R&D or to assess the impact of federally funded R&D on U.S. innovation, productivity, and competitiveness.
This low level of funding for knowledge transfer and utilization (compared to knowledge production) supports the conclusion that knowledge transfer and utilization are not components (or simply not important ones) of the R&D process. An alternative conclusion is that government-funded R&D is simply funded for the sake of R&D; that is, to lay the groundwork for future technological development and advancement but without any clear or immediate application or direction in mind. The American public has the right to expect that the approximately $60 billion spent each year by the federal government for R&D should somehow support both short-and long-term national economic goals while increasing the country's competitive position in the world marketplace.
There is general agreement that the results of this expenditure have the potential to do exactly that. There is also concern that a host of mitigating factors may be restricting the utilization of federally funded STI, thus limiting industrial productivity and innovation and inhibiting the economic competitiveness and vitality of the country.
There is general agreement that coherent, systematically designed public policy is needed for transferring the results of federally funded STI to maximize U.S. economic com-
petitiveness.
Such a goal can be reached but it takes the will of a people; the formulation, 
